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STUDENT MATERIAL
Student Notes
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION: A SURVEY
OF FEDERAL CASELAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, employers have regarded an individual's marital status to be
an important factor in their employment decisions. The fact that a job appli-
cant, for example, is married to a present employee of the company will, in
most cases, exclude the person from consideration, even though he or she may
be otherwise fully qualified. Similarly, an individual who experiments outside
the traditional marriage relationship often times finds prospective and present
employers very unforgiving, to the point of actually discharging the offending
employee.
In both these instances, the employer is looking past job skills into matters
which can be best described as the private domain of the individual. The em-
ployer has suddenly become more than a businessman, engaged in a commer-
cial enterprise; he has become a type of judge; with the ability to reward or
penalize those who run afoul of his standards of conduct. To the person who
feels the sting of the employer's judgment, the results can be as disruptive and
unfair as other, more visible forms of employment discrimination.
Anytime employers make decisions based on factors unrelated to job capa-
bilities, one class of individuals is bound to suffer more than others. Marital
discrimination is no exception. The group which is most often victimized by
the "marital status" factor is women. But, unfortunately, there is no federal
legislation specifically banning discrimination based on marital status. An indi-
vidual seeking relief from such discrimination must therefore tailor her com-
plaint to fit within existing law, such as the sex discrimination provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964;1 the various constitutional provisions which pro-
tect privacy;2 or one of the recently enacted state statutes outlawing marital
status discrimination.3 The result of this creative tailoring is a large body of
case law with little or no predictability - a body of law that is further con-
fused because of the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize this as a discrete
form of employment discrimination.4
An issue related to the marital status factor is discrimination based on a
person's sexual activity outside the scope of marriage. Employers frequently
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981).
2 See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 See infra note 124.
' See infra text accompanying notes 74-81.
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have codes of morality by which they assess an employee's fitness for the job.
Challenges to these codes have resulted in a body of case law which usually
upholds the employer's actions because the particular employee's conduct is
not sanctioned by the majority of society. Here, too, the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to concede that this intrusion is a deprivation of one's rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.5
The first part of this paper will deal with marital status discrimination
under Title VII. It will cover the components of the plaintiff's suit and the
alternative defenses of the employer. It will survey the case law on marital
status discrimination, including explicit employer marital requirements, as well
as "neutral" no spouse policies. The second part of the paper will deal with
discrimination against persons based on their sexual conduct defined by mari-
tal status. It will attempt to explore the constitutional issues implicit in this
area by surveying cases which have dealt with discrimination against unwed
mothers, cohabitating couples, and persons engaged in extramarital affairs.
II. MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Statutory Provisions
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 does not specifically address it-
self to an employer's use of marital status as a factor in employment decisions.
Section 2000e-2a(2) of the Act provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to
limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' '1 Undaunted by
the omission of marital status from this list, most litigators have attacked the
problem as a form of sex discrimination.
The conventional view is that sex was added as a protected class to the
Civil Rights Act for the purpose of making the Act unacceptable to a majority
of the male-dominated Congress.8 In short, sex was added as a ploy to defeat
the total Civil Rights Act. Nevertheless, the amendment adding sex was pro-
posed and approved on February 8, 1964,1 and the House passed the Civil
Rights Act only two days later.10
The approved legislation established the Equal Employment Opportunity
5 See infra text accompanying notes 182-95.
See supra note 1.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1981).
8 Schlei, FoEEWARD TO B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATIoN LAW at xi-xli
(1976). But see Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII
and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453 (1981).
9 U.S. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII & TrrLE XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
at 3213-28 (1964).
W See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1169 (1971); Note, Classification on the
Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IowA L. REV. 778, 791-92 (1965).
[Vol. 85
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Commission (EEOC)11 as the federal agency with the primary duty of adminis-
tering the provisions of Title VII. To discharge this duty, the EEOC has for-
mulated regulations to interpret and implement the mandate of Title VII. In
the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,1 2 the employer's use
of distinctions based on marital status has been recognized as a form of sex
discrimination. Under these guidelines, restrictions on married women with no
comparable restrictions on married men violates Title VII,13 unless the distinc-
tions are justified under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification1 4 defense.
The courts are not bound to adhere to EEOC guidelines and have bluntly
refused to do so in the past. 5 The courts' rationale is that the guidelines are
merely interpretative . There is authority, however, supporting deference to
EEOC guidelines.1 7 For example, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1 8 represents the
view that the guidelines promulgated by the EEOC, as the enforcement agency
for Title VII, are entitled to great weight.19 The Supreme Court, there, after
noting that the guidelines were entitled to great deference, stated that the
guidelines should be treated as "expressing the will of Congress" where they
are supported by Title VII and legislative history.
20
B. Procedural and Jurisdictional Requirements for a Title VII Suit
In order to bring a suit on the basis of marital status discrimination under
Title VII, certain procedural and jurisdictional requirements must be met. A
plaintiff must file a timely charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC.21 The
EEOC will then refer the charge to the appropriate state or local agency in
order to provide that agency with an opportunity to resolve the dispute be-
tween the employer and employee before the federal agency intervenes.22 The
Commission will allow the state sixty days to affect settlement before the Com-
mission actively takes a role. Next, the EEOC will issue a "right to sue" no-
tice.2  The plaintiff must institute his or her suit within ninety days of the
receipt of the notice.
2 '
If the individual complies with these procedural prerequisites within the
specified time frame, the federal court is vested with jurisdiction. Even if the
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, e-5 (1981).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 to 1604.11 (1981).
, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(a) (1981).
14 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4(b) (1981).
1' General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 92-95 (1973).
1 429 U.S. at 145.
17 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976).
18 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
19 Id. at 433-34.
20 Id. at 434.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1981).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1981).
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EEOC has determined that no reasonable cause for the suit exists,2 5 the federal
court may still entertain the employment discrimination suit. The United
States Supreme Court has decided that the EEOC's "absence of reasonable
cause" determination does not provide the employer immunity from similar
charges in a federal court.
28
C. Plaintiff's Theory of the Case
A plaintiff in a marital status discrimination case under Title VII may
base his or her claim on two alternative theories - disparate treatment or
disparate impact.
In disparate treatment cases, the employer's treatment of one individual
(or group) is different from another because of that person's sex.2 7 The plaintiff
must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing that she belonged to a protected class under Title VII; that
she applied and was qualified and was subsequently rejected; and that the em-
ployer was still looking for an employee or the job was given to a member of an
unprotected class.28 If the plaintiff meets her burden, the burden then must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. If the employer meets its burden, then the plaintiff must be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated reasons were in
fact pretextual.
29
In "disparate impact" cases, employment practices are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but have a more severe impact on one pro-
tected group. This is also a Title VII violation unless the employer can prove
that the practice is justified under the business necessity defense.3 0 Broad prin-
ciples and guidelines for making this judgment were set forth in the landmark
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.31 In order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in
question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern.
Once it is shown that the practice is discriminatory in effect, the employer
must meet the burden of showing that any given requirement has a manifest
relation to the employment in question.
Unlike "discriminatory treatment" cases and constitutional equal protec-
tion cases, 32 a party may rely solely upon the disparate impact theory of dis-
265 29 C.F.R. § 1601.30 (1981).
26 McDonnell Douglas Corp.- v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2' MODJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES, (1980) [hereinafter cited as
MODJESKA].
26 411 U.S. at 802. The shifting burden of proof in Title VII cases was made applicable to sex
discrimination cases in Peltier v. Fargo, 396 F. Supp. 710 (D.N.D. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1975).
29 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24 (1978).
'o MODJESKA, supra note 27.
21 401 U.S. 424. Although the subject matter of this case was race discrimination, its principles
were extended to cases of sex discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
22 The Supreme Court has not applied the statutory disproportionate standard of Griggs to
[Vol. 85
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crimination and need not establish an intent to discriminate to make out a
cause of action.33
The use of statistics is often indispensable in making out a prima facie
case of unintentional discrimination.3 4 For example, in a leading case on mari-
tal status discrimination, Yuhas v. Libby Owens-Ford Co.,35 the court looked to
the statistical evidence which showed that seventy-three female and only three
male job applicants were denied employment to determine that the women had
proven a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.3 Another
court, however, held that mere evidence of what happened to other couples
who experienced the impact of an employer's no-spouse policy was irrelevant
to a plaintiff's burden of proof in a Title VII case.37 Both cases make it clear,
however, that it is essential for the plaintiffs in marital status cases to establish
a nexus between the discriminatory policy and the alleged injury.38
D. Employer Defenses
Employers opposing a claim that marital distinctions in employment con-
stitute sex discrimination have two possible defenses. One defense asserted by
employers is the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)39 exception.
Under this defense theory employers claim that the offensive policy is reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of their business, legitimately entitling
them to discriminate.' Although "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification" is
not specifically defined in Title VII, the EEOC, in its interpretive regulations,
has defined BFOQ narrowly. EEOC states that it will consider sex to be a
BFOQ only where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness.4
1
The United States Supreme Court has also interpreted the BFOQ defense
to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition against dis-
constitutional equal protection issues. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court, holding that disproportionate impact standing alone was sufficient
to establish a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court embraced the standard that a discrimi-
natory purpose must be shown.
" Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975-76).
" 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
38 In Yuhas, the trial court felt that the statistical imbalance was evidence of a prima facie
violation of Title VII, shifting as in Griggs the burden of proof to the defendant to establish busi-
ness need for the rule. 562 F.2d at 497.
37 The court in Meier v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 416 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ind.
1975), afl'd mem., 539 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976), declared that the instant case was not a class
action and that evidence of what happened to other possible plaintiffs did not meet the present
plaintiff's burden of proof. 416 F. Supp. at 751.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). In Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 545
(D. Colo. 1973), the court denied relief to two airline stewardesses because they did not show the
necessary nexus between the employer policy and their discharge.
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
40 Id.
41 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(2) (1982).
1983]
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crimination on the basis of sex.42 The test must be one of business necessity,
not merely business convenience.43 The burden of proof is placed upon the
employer who relies on it. The employer must not only assert that hiring em-
ployees would undermine the essence of its business operation, but that it has
a factual basis for holding this belief." Discriminatory employment criteria
based upon stereotyped classifications, generalizations, and assumptions do not
rise to the level of BFOQs.
45
As previously mentioned, another possible defense for an employer
charged with sex discrimination is found in the doctrine of "business neces-
sity" adopted in Griggs.46 It has been asserted that subsequent to Griggs the
business necessity doctrine has been broadened far beyond the original narrow
holding that employer practices must be related to job performance. 7 At least
one court has held that the employer's burden is very slight in defending his
marital distinction policy on the grounds of business necessity."
E. Forms of Discrimination
1. Explicit Marital Requirements: Sex Plus Marital Status
"Sex plus" employment policies are those which impose on persons of one
sex conditions of employment not imposed on persons of the other sex.49 In the
landmark decision, Phillips v. Martin Marietta,"0 the Supreme Court held that
"sex plus" employment policies were indeed sex discrimination and thus viola-
tive of Title VII. Applying this standard to marital status discrimination, the
correct methodology is to cancel out the common characteristics of the two
classes being compared (married women and married men). If the canceled ele-
ment is marital status and sex remains the only operative factor,51 then a case
of unlawful discrimination is proved.
Historically, the airline industry52 has imposed different marriage policies
42 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
43 Modjeska, supra note 27.
" Fesel v. Masonic Home, 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), af'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.
1979).
45 Modjeska, supra note 27, at 42.
4 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47 Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No Alterna-
tive Approach, 84 Yale L.J. 98, 98 (1974-1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971)).
48 In Yuhas v. Libby Owens-Ford, 562 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978), a sufficient defense was made out because "plausible" reasons support the assumption that
it is generally a bad idea to have both partners in a marriage working together.
"' Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. RE V. 1109 (1971); see also LARSON, Employment Discrimination (1982) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON].
50 400 U.S. 542 (1971). The Supreme Court held that a company's policy against hiring women
with pre-school age children, while hiring men with such children, violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
61 See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971); Inda v. United Airlines, 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
2 Courts have also struck down "no-marriage" policies in various other industries. See gener-
ally EEOC Decision Case No. 70-38 (1969) EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6042 (busing industry); Jurinko v.
[Vol. 85
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on its employees depending on their sex. The majority of the courts and the
EEOC have found that an airline's no-marriage rule for stewardesses resulted
in sex discrimination. The no-marriage policies were implemented through pre-
hiring agreements," s collective bargaining agreements, 54 or union policies. 5 The
courts struck down these policies on the ground that the restriction on stew-
ardesses was not justified under the BFOQ exception, which specifically re-
quires a correlation between a condition of employment and satisfactory per-
formance of the employee's occupational duties.5 6 The marital status of
stewardesses could not be said to affect the individual woman's ability to cre-
ate the proper psychological climate of comfort, safety, and security for passen-
gers.5 7 One airline attempted to circumvent the no-marriage rule by a modified
marital restriction whereby a stewardess could return to active service if she
had been terminated because of marriage and had filed a valid grievance in
protest or had filed a valid complaint with EEOC or a state agency.58 The
Court held that this modification carried forward the consequences of its past
discriminatory policy.5 9
One court completely misapplied the rule. In Cooper v. Delta Air Lines,60
an airline had a policy banning employment of stewardesses who were married,
but allowed male stewards to marry and retain their jobs. The district court
held this to be nondiscriminatory, because it was a case of discrimination
against married persons, not against women, and Congress had not intended
marital status to be included within Title VII coverage.6 1
A minority of courts rejected claims of certain airline stewardesses that
their transfers, terminations or forced resignations after marriage were based
upon sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. One court s2 found no sex
Edwin L. Weigland Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970
(1973) (manufacturing industry); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Tex.
1976) (banking).
83 In EEOC Decision Case No. 6-8-6975 (1968) EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6003, the Commission
held Title VII was violated when an airline required female applicants for employment as steward-
esses to sign a pre-employment agreement to terminate employment upon marriage. See also
EEOC Decision Case No. YSF 9-060 (1969) EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6011.
54 The court in Sangster v. United Air Lines, 438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afi'd, 633
F.2d 864 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981), held that the collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and union was in violation of Title VII because it barred married stewardess
supervisors from transferring to stewardess positions while not imposing the same requirement on
single women or similarly situated men. See also EEOC Decision Case No. 6-6-5759 (1968) EEOC
Dec. (CCH) 1 6002.
5 In Landsdale v. Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l, 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970), the court held
that a union which caused an airline employer to permit male stewards to marry while denying the
same privilege to stewardesses was in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (c).
" Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1199, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
87 Id.
88 Inda v. United Air Lines, 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
8, Id. at 562.
40 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
61 Id. at 783. See also Landsdale v. United Air Lines, 2 F.E.P. 462, 62 Lab. Cas. (CCH) T 9417
(S.D. Fla. 1964).
62 Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
See E.E.O.C. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978).
1983]
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discrimination merely because the airlines did not employ male stewards in the
first place. Another court 3 denied recovery to two stewardesses because they
did not establish the necessary nexus between the no-marriage policy and their
resignations.
Marriage policies 64 have also been found to violate Title VII under the
sex-plus marital status classifications. The EEOC had held, for example, that
an employer who has a policy requiring female truck drivers but not male
truck drivers to be married is in violation of Title VII.65 In that ruling, the
Commission said that the employer failed to prove a BFOQ defense when it
attempted to show that hiring single females as truck drivers would jeopardize
both safety and the efficient transportation of goods."6
Today, the cases of sex-plus marital status are much more subtle than the
"no-marriage" rules of yesterday. For example, in one EEOC case,6 7 the com-
mon characteristics were marriage and family responsibility. A female with
fifteen years of sales experience was passed over in favor of a male employee
with only six years experience for a position on the company's traveling sales
staff. The employer advanced the reason that the female employee's husband
had been ill on and off for several years, and that it preferred someone for the
traveling job who would not have family considerations that might interfere
with getting on the road early. 8 The company did not say it would similarly
pass over a male whose wife had been ill. In the Commission's view, the com-
pany's preference was based on stereotypical notions about the family respon-
sibilities of males and females; thus the differentiation was based on sex.6 9
Another variant of the sex plus marital status classifications involves
mandatory name change policies for married women. In Allen v. Lovejoy,70 a
county government had suspended a married female employee for her refusal
to comply with its policy which required married women to use their husband's
surnames on personnel forms. The court of appeals held that this was sex dis"
crimination, reversing the district court which determined that this kind of
discrimination was not proscribed by Title VII. 1
2. "Neutral" Marital Requirements: No-Spouse Rules
No-Spouse rules are a fairly common employment policy. The policy is
classified as a neutral factor because it is facially sex-neutral in almost all in-
stances,7 2 and because it is generally conceded that the rules have been
63 Gerstle v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 545 (D. Colo. 1973).
4 G. DOUTHWAITE, Unmarried Couples (1979) [hereinafter cited as G. DOUTHWAITE].
11 EEOC Decision Case No. 71-2048 (1971) EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6244.
66 Id.
67 EEOC Decision Case No. 71-2613 (1973).
" Id.
69 Id.
70 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 524.
72 McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 508 (D. Ga. 1975), vacated, 556 F.2d 298
(5th Cir. 1977), dismissed, 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978), is the only reported case in which the
[Vol. 85
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adopted for nondiscriminatory reasons."3 However, discrimination has fre-
quently been found because the no-spouse rule works disproportionate damage
on the employment opportunities of one sex. Most cases begin with an attempt
to establish the proposition that it is most often the wife who is terminated
under the rule.
In the leading case, Yuhas v. Libby Owens-Ford Co., 7 4 the Seventh Circuit
upheld the defendant's policy prohibiting employment of the spouse of a cur-
rently employed hourly worker.7 5 The plaintiff introduced statistics of the fe-
male/male ratio that had been affected by the plant's rule. Both the district
court and the circuit court concluded that the impressive statistics made out a
prima facie case7 6 of sex discrimination. However, the defendant put forth
plausible reasons to support the assumption that it is generally a bad idea to
have both partners in a marriage working together. These reasons included:
[I]nterference with job performance caused by intense emotions generated in
the marital relationship that cannot be temporarily put aside by leaving home
to go to work when one's spouse works at the same place; the expectation that
spouses would side together in a grievance; problems of conflict of interest if
one spouse were promoted to a supervisory position over the other; and undue
influence in the hiring process.7
Although the defendant never put forth any evidence that the rule increases
production, the argument that the no-spouse rule improves the workplace was
convincing to the court, meriting summary judgment.8
The Seventh Circuit's adoption of the employer's rationale has serious im-
plications in the area of marital status discrimination. First of all, it marks a
retreat from the stringent, Griggs,7 9 job-related requirement test, because it
has the effect of condoning stereotypical beliefs that a working environment
where some of the employees are married to one another is somehow unsafe or
inefficient. Thus, many qualified persons will continue to be foreclosed from
employment opportunities because of the mere identity and occupation of
their spouse. Another repercussion of Yuhas is that plaintiffs may no longer be
able to rely solely on convincing statistical evidence to prove disparate impact.
Evidence of an employer's intent to discriminate 0 may be necessary to
strengthen the plaintiff's prima facie case. Thirdly, because sex discrimination
is difficult to discern from neutral policies in the fiist place, the minimal "busi-
ness necessity" justification accepted by the Seventh Circuit may prompt other
regulation was discriminatory on its face because the rule forbade only the employment of wives of
male employees.
73 LARSON, supra note 49.
74 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
75 Id. It is interesting to note that the rule does not require discharging either spouse of
couples already married and does not require terminating an employee who marries a fellow em-
ployee. Furthermore, the rule does not extend to executives.
7' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
77 Yuhas v. Libby Owens-Ford, 562 F.2d at 499.
70 Id.
70 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
80 See supra notes 27-33.
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employers to continue past discriminatory practices under the mask of any os-
tensibly neutral policy. Some evidence of this can be found in subsequent mar-
ital status discrimination cases which have cited Yuhas with approval. 1
The opposite result, however, was reached by the EEOCs2 in a case factu-
ally similar to Yuhas. The Commission concluded that the fact that the em-
ployer had rejected sixty-five female applicants and only one male applicant
because of the no spouse rule strongly inferred sex discrimination. 3 Unlike the
result reached in Yuhas, the Commission ruled that the defendant did not pre-
sent documentary or testimonial evidence supporting the contention that the
rule was occasioned by problems of jealousy and absenteeism, and thus had not
met its burden of proof.
Several variations to the "traditional" no-spouse rule have emerged, plac-
ing specific restrictions on married couples working together.
A few employers do not absolutely prohibit the employment of spouses,
preferring instead to limit the employment of a spouse to jobs over which a
member of that person's immediate family does not exercise supervisory au-
thority.8 4 Courts have uniformly held that this is neither discriminatory in its
application, nor in conflict with EEOC guidelines.8 5 One court, however, in
dicta, stated that even this less restrictive no-spouse rule placed an indirect
burden on the employed couple to marry based on position. 8
Several employers have rules both banning the employment of a spouse in
the same department and allowing the couple to decide, upon marriage, which
one will leave.8 7 This rule has met with outrage from women's organizations
based on the argument that the end result is a discriminatory impact on the
female partner who is usually the one to quit.8 8 As the cases illustrate, their
attacks have met with modest success in the courts.
In the leading case on this point, Harper v. Trans World Airlines,89 the
81 See infra text accompanying notes 112-116.
82 EEOC Decision Case No. 75-239 (1976) EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6492.
83 Id. The Commission concluded that the impact of the no-spouse rule was additional evi-
dence of the fact that the employer generally did not hire female applicants.
8, Southwestern Community v. Community Services, 462 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. W. Va. 1978); see
also, McSpadden v. Millins, 456 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1972).
85 Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 11 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) T 10876 (D.N.J.
1976).
86 In Satterfield v. Greenville, 395 F. Supp. 698 (D. Tex. 1975), modified, 549 F.2d 347 (5th
Cir.), modified on reh'g, 557 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1977), the court held that a municipal employer
who refused to hire a female applicant as its airport manager in order to avoid violating a provision
of its city charter relating to conflicts of interest because the husband was a prime user of the
airport was not sex discrimination under Title VII. Similarly, in Emory v. Georgia Hospital Service
Ass'n, 446 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1971), the court found no sex discrimination where an insurance
company terminated a female employee pursuant to a policy of not employing or retaining in em-
ployment any person whose spouse was employed by an insurance company in active competition.
87 Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975); Tuck v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hess v. Oregon Employment Div., 29 Or. App. 229, 562 P.2d
1232 (1977).
88 G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 64.
89 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
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airline had a rule that prohibited spouses from working together and gave the
couple thirty days after the marriage to determine which spouse would leaveY°
If the couple could not agree, the less senior employee was forced to resign. In
this case, the wife, who had lesser seniority, was discharged and brought suit
on the ground that the rule had a disparate impact on women.9 ' The court
concluded that the married former employee failed to prove by statistics 2 or
other probative evidence 3 that the airline rule adversely affected women.
In another instance, a court94 denied recovery to a female reporter who
was terminated based on a publishing company's "close relative rule," which
prevented her from transferring to the company's New York office.96 The court
ruled that the woman failed to prove her case on the sex plus marital status
argument, as well as her disparate impact argument. The court rejected the
argument that the rule operated to perpetuate past discrimination and ap-
plauded the employer's concern in offering to help the reporter find other
employment."
In still another instance, a woman quit her job as a result of being trans-
ferred pursuant to a company policy prohibiting married couples from working
in the same department.9 7 When she sued for unemployment compensation,
the court held that leaving work under the policy was not good cause within
the meaning of the statute. The court concluded that the employer's business
reasons - that the department would be shorthanded if a couple wished to
transfer simultaneously, go on vacation, or take days off - were valid.,
What may be inferred from the courts' rationale in these cases is that, if
the onus is placed upon the couple to decide, the employer is relieved of any
liability stemming from his policy which disparately impacts on women. These
cases also ignore the settled distinction between business necessity and busi-
ness convenience under the traditional Title VII analysis.
The same types of issues often arise in the public sector context. School
boards, in particular, often have a policy of not permitting spouses to teach in
the same school.9 9 Plaintiffs have challenged these types of rules from a Title
90 Id.
91 Id. at 410. The plaintiff asserted that although the rule gives the couple the right to decide
which one will be released, more women than men will voluntarily terminate. Since the wife usu-
ally earns less than the man, the family would be harmed less if she were to quit. It was further
alleged that because of the discrimination against women in hirings and promotions in the market
place, there is less incentive for the woman to retain employment.
92 Id. at 412. The Court held that even though in four out of five cases where the problem
arose, the woman left, the number was not statistically significant.
93 Id. at 413. The Court found no evidence to support the proposition that women are not in
the upper jobs or that women were foreclosed upward mobility. There was also no evidence that
the defendant engaged in discriminatory hiring or promotion.
9, Tuck v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
95 Id. at 40.
96 Id. at 42.
' Hess v. Oregon Employment Div., 29 Or. App. 229, 562 P.2d 1232 (1977).
11 Id. at 232, 562 P.2d at 1234.
99 G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 64.
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VII standpoint 00 and a constitutional standpoint 0' and have met with little
success on both fronts, despite the lack of job-related evidence put forth by the
employers.
In the leading case on nepotism rules in educational institutions, Meier v.
Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.,1'0 a female schoolteacher was trans-
ferred to another school following her marriage to a teacher employed at the
same school pursuant to the school's unwritten policy. The court concluded
that the teacher failed to prove her prima facie case of sex discrimination
based on the fact that the couple was aware of the long-standing policy of their
employer prohibiting spouses from teaching in the same school.10 3 The court
declared:
While Congress clearly intended for that legislation [Civil Rights Act] to elimi-
nate the stereotype station in life which had hindered women's social, eco-
nomic, and political progress, it cannot be said Congress intended to permit a
woman to use the Act as a 'whipsaw' to sue her employer for alleged discrimi-
natory acts created by a marital decision which made certain the very conduct
she seeks to redress.10
In institutions of higher education, the problem becomes intensified if the
couple's expertise is in the same area. A university stated that it did not hire a
female applicant as a chemistry professor because, among other things, her re-
search expertise was essentially identical to that of her husband, a member of
the chemistry department. 10 5 Thus, the court held that factors unrelated to sex
caused rejection of the female applicant.
One court, 0 6 however, found that a university's nepotism rule was dis-
criminatory, unnecessary and served no job-related purpose.10 7 The facts of the
case showed that in twenty-seven nepotism cases involving husbands and wives
at the university, none of the husbands were required to accept temporary ap-
pointment, while the wife was either given temporary appointment or had the
nepotism rule waived when the school 'wanted to attract a star professor.108
The plaintiff in this case was a "temporary" appointee and sought reinstate-
ment because she was a term appointee before her marriage and before she
obtained her doctorate.'09
Perhaps this area best exemplifies the inadequacy of existing remedies to
combat marital status discrimination. The effect of antinepotism rules, espe-
100 Meier v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 416 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd
mem., 539 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976); Sime v. Trustees of State University, 526 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir.
1975).
102 Lewis v. Spencer, 468 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
102 416 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd mem., 539 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976).
103 Id. at 751.
104 Id.
101 Sime v. Trustees of State University, 526 F.2d at 1114.
108 Sanbonmatsu v. Boyer, 45 A.D.2d 249, 357 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1974), appeal dismissed, 36
N.Y.2d 871, 331 N.E.2d 701, 370 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1974).
:07 Id. at 253, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
108 Id. at 252, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
,0 Id. at 250-51, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
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cially in higher education, has been to systematically exclude women from the
profession. "One would expect that nepotism rules which circumscribe prac-
tices on [marital status] would require a powerful rationale to justify its
existence."'1 O
The no-spouse rule has also been applied to unmarried couples.' In Espi-
noza v. Thoma,"' Karen Espinoza was denied employment with Metro Area
Transit (MAT) of Omaha" 3 pursuant to MAT's no-spouse policy because she
was cohabitating with another bus driver. She challenged her denial because
she was a single woman and had no claim to status as a common law wife
under Nebraska law. 1 4 Initially, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the no-
spouse policy was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment"1 5 and affirmed the district court's assessment that:
[P]reclusion of spouses bears a fair and substantial relation to the objectives of
the policy to eliminate the potential for serious conflicts that might affect job
performance; that the classification is neither arbitrary nor capricious; and that
there was no evidence which would indicate that all persons similarly circum-
stanced as Espinoza would not be treated alike."16
Next, the court addressed the additional question of whether the word 'spouse'
should be interpreted to include persons who are not legally married but who
are living together. The court concluded that, in view of the stated purpose of
the no-spouse rule, "the interpretation of the word 'spouse' to include a person
who lives in an espoused relationship is valid and logical." 1 7
This case demonstrates the difficulty of challenging a no-spouse rule on
equal protection grounds because of the minimal scrutiny afforded in the anal-
ysis of the classification. When a classification involves no suspect class, is not
based on the immutable characteristics of gender, and does not restrict the
exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, the court will usually defer to
110 Id. at 252, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
III Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,876 (D. N.J. 1976). The
claimant challenged the employer's policy forbidding a spouse from supervising his or her spouse.
The court held it was applied uniformly without regard to sex and was applied to unmarried
couples, thus avoiding any sexual stereotypes.
112 580 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1978).
11' Id. at 347. It is interesting to note that Ms. Espinoza applied for the job in 1974 and was
told she was too small to handle large buses. At this point she filed a Title VII action, alleging that
MAT's height and weight requirements were unlawful. Subsequently, Espinoza and MAT entered
into a conciliation agreement stating that MAT would hire her if she met other qualifications. She
took the physical examination in July, 1974, and was informed that since she was three months
pregnant she was unable to meet the physical strength requirement. She was informed that she
could try again after delivery. Ms. Espinoza returned in February, 1975, and reapplied. She passed
the physical and arrived early in June, 1975, to begin training when she was informed that she
would not be hired because of MAT's no-spouse policy.
114 Id. at 348. Nebraska does not recognize common law marriage.
1" U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
116 Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d at 347.
"I' Id. at 349. It is curious to speculate whether the outcome would have been different if Ms.
Espinoza would have challenged MAT's policy under the Title VII, McDonald Douglas criteria
where evidence of pretext to discriminate would comprise an essential element of the case.
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other governmental branches through the use of the rational basis test.118
Thus, the court in Espinoza was willing to accept any conceivable basis for an
employment classification based on a no-spouse rule.
The no-spouse rule is also vulnerable to constitutional challenge on the
ground that it infringes on the fundamental right to marry 19 - a right which
courts have inferred from the text of the United States Constitution. 20 In
most cases the right has been asserted in conjunction with other claims of a
non-constitutional nature. But, unfortunately, these challenges are usually un-
successful. Most courts generally find a way to uphold the no-spouse policy by
focusing upon the employer's justifications, without ever addressing the plain-
tiff's fundamental right to marry. 121 One exception is the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision in Volchahoske v. City of Grand Island. 22 There the court
reversed a lower ruling that the City had a reasonable basis for the ordinance
which prohibited the employment of both husband and wife. The court stated
that the right to marry was a fundamental right protected under the first, fifth,
ninth and fourteenth amendments. 23 Therefore, the court reasoned, the City
must show a 'compelling interest' in enforcement of the challenged ordinance
to justify an intrusion on the right to marry.
4. State Attempts to Eliminate Marital Status Discrimination
The most recent development in the area of marital status discrimination
law is the enactment of state antidiscrimination statutes to specifically include
"marital status" discrimination in the list of unlawful employer practices. To
date, nineteen states 124 have included such provisions.
It is apparent that this new category of proscribed employer conduct was
enacted by states to provide victims of marital status discrimination a more
effective remedy than is presently available under suits based on either Title
18 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524-25 (1978); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012, 1052-53 (1978).
119 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629-30 (1978).
120 The Court has attached the label of "fundamental" only to those rights viewed as essential
to the concept of individual liberty. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). A regulation that
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right requires rigorous scrutiny and
must be supported by a compelling state interest and be closely tailored to effectuate only that
interest.
121 See Hasenbein v. Seibert, 83 A.D.2d 875, 442 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1981), afl'd, 56 N.Y.2d 853,
438 N.E.2d 877, 453 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1982).
22 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,247 (Neb. 1975).
123 In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that
the right to marry underlies the purposes of the Constitution, although not mentioned therein, and
is a fundamental right afforded protection by the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). "The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its spe-
cific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are
of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."
124 Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington.
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VII12 5 or the United States Constitution. 12 6 However, these statutes have not
fully achieved this purpose. Instead, they have created a new controversy be-
cause "marital status" is not defined anywhere in these statutes. Does 'marital
status' denote the particular relation an individual bears to the marital state,
i.e., that phase of his or her personal lifestyle which is classifiable as "single,"
"married," "separated," "divorced," or "widowed"? Or does "marital status"
look beyond the conjugal state to embrace the identity or situation of the indi-
vidual's spouse?
127
Courts faced with these questions have attempted to define their respec-
tive legislatures' specific intent in including marital status on the list of unlaw-
ful employer practices. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana, in
Thompson v. Board of Trustees,12 concluded that marital status included the
identity and occupation of one's spouse, and found for the plaintiffs as a mat-
ter of law. The court stated: "'[M]arital status' is not defined anywhere in the
statutes relating to antidiscriminatory employment practices," so we are re-
quired to interpret liberally "with a view to effect their objects and to promote
justice.' 29 Furthermore, the court remarked that the statute is a strongly
worded directive from the legislature prohibiting employment discrimination
and encouraging the hiring, promotion, and dismissal solely on one's merit. 30
Similarly, in Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human
Rights Commission, 3' the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial
court's decision and reinstated the Human Rights Commission determination
that marital status includes the identity and occupation of his or her spouse.
The court held that the Commission was justified in its interpretation because
it was given broad policy formulation and rule-making powers.' 32 Thus, the
court concluded that an antinepotism employment policy was prohibited under
the statute, making it an unfair practice to refuse to hire any person because of
marital status.
13 3
On the other side of the coin are the courts that argue that, absent a statu-
tory definition, words must be given their "ordinary, everyday meaning.""
3
4
The New York Court of Appeals in Manhattan Pizza Hut v. New York,"15 for
example, ruled that "marital status" is a social condition enjoyed by an indi-
vidual by reason of his or her having participated or failing to participate in
125 See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
226 See supra note 24.
27 Manhattan Pizza Hut v. New York, 72 A.D.2d 556, 420 N.Y.S.2d 761, 415 N.E.2d 950,
rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
125 627 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1981).
,:9 Id. at 1231.
0 Id.; see also Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
131 91 Wash.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978). In this case, employees announced their intention to
marry and resist discharge under employer's no-spouse rule, and respondents brought this suit to
test the validity of the regulation.
:32 Id. at 67, 586 P.2d at 1152.
1: Id. at 69, 586 P.2d at 1154.
4' Id. at 71, 586 P.2d at 1155 (Hicks, J., dissenting).
15 72 A.D.2d 556, 420 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. App. 1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950,
434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
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marriage."' The majority stated that, "[h]ad the legislature desired to enlarge
the scope of its proscription to prohibit discrimination based on an individual's
marital relationships - rather than simply on an individual's marital status -
surely it would have said so.1'13
Similarly, a district court in Michigan,13 8 citing Manhattan Pizza Hut,
concluded that a no-spouse rule does not come into play by virtue of a person
getting married and assuming the status of a married person but, rather, comes
into play by virtue of whom you select as a spouse. 139 This, the court reasoned,
is a significant distinction in evaluating discrimination based on marital status.
The court cited the Superior Court of New Jersey in Thompson v. Sanborn's
Motor Express, Inc.'4 for the proposition that identity and occupation of a
spouse is a far cry from the fact of his or her existence."'
The phrase "marital status" in the various statutes may have intention-
ally been undefined by state legislatures. These cases demonstrate that dis-
crimination based on marital status can be discrimination based both on one's
conjugal state and on the identity and occupation of one's spouse. The court's
role is to fill in the holes, depending upon the factual setting, to achieve the
optimum social policy. No-spouse rules prevent a person from remaining in
present employment or obtaining future employment. It would appear that the
optimum social policy is to insure that individuals be judged solely on their
own merit. Thus, it seems evident that courts faced with a no-spouse rule chal-
lenge must construe marital status to be defined as the identity and occupation
of one's spouse. If future no-spouse cases do not analyze "marital status" in
this fashion, these state statutes must be relegated to the list of inadequate
remedies.
III. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON CONDUCT DEFINED By MARITAL STATUS
There is a large body of case law in which private employers, as well as
government agencies, have attempted to regulate the private lives of their em-
ployees by prescribing what constitutes an acceptable marriage relationship. In
the majority of cases, employers enforce their peculiar brand of acceptable con-
duct by terminating nonconforming employees on the ground of immorality.
The victims of these decisions have begun to challenge their discharges, alleg-
ing deprivations of constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed rights. This sec-
tion will survey the growing body of law to determine how these challenges
have fared.
33 51 N.Y.2d at 511, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
:37 Id. at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
" Klanseck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 509 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1980). In this case
employer had a policy requiring one of its district agents upon marriage to each other to resign or
be transferred to the sales staff or to the home office.
139 Id. at 18.
110 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (1977). In this case the issue was whether the employer's
policy prohibiting the contemporaneous full-time employment of relatives was in violation of New
Jersey statute, "Law Against Discrimination."
141 509 F. Supp. at 18.
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There have been myriad attempts by employers to discriminate against
single women because of their temporary status as an unwed mother.
School boards have vigorously attempted to dictate the conduct of female
teachers by implementation of a written or unwritten'42 "unwed mother" pol-
icy. The school boards have offered various rationales through which they as-
sert that their rule furthers the creation of a proper moral and scholastic envi-
ronment. For example, they have asserted that unwed parenthood is prima
facie proof of immorality;"4 that unwed mothers are improper communal role
models after whom students may pattern their lives;'" and that employment
of an unwed mother in a scholastic environment materially contributes to the
problem of schoolgirl pregnancy.
145
1. Teacher Cases
Unmarried female teachers who have been discharged because of preg-
nancy have challenged these school board policies on constitutional grounds.
Discharged teachers have alleged a violation of their fundamental right to
privacy' 46 when the state has interfered in their personal choice to bear a
child.147 Most cases advancing this theory have argued that the state must jus-
tify intrusions on personal privacy under the 'compelling state interest' test.'41
In some cases this argument has succeeded. For example, in Drake v. Board of
Education,14 a three judge court ruled that the cancellation of an unmarried,
pregnant teacher's contract was a violation of her constitutional right to pri-
vacy, because the school board obtained the information about her condition
from the teacher's physician. To the court, the school board's invasion into the
teacher's privacy could not be justified under a 'compelling state interest' test,
because her pregnancy had nothing to do with her in-class performance.' 50
In another case' 5' the dismissal of an unwed teacher was challenged under
the equal protection clause. The Fifth Circuit stated that a school board policy
of firing unwed, pregnant teachers was "fraught with invidious discrimination"
142 Cochran v. Chidester School Dist., 456 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Ark. 1978). In this case there
was no objective standard governing the employment, assignment or dismissal of teachers, either
written or orally announced.
"' Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
144 Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Neb. 1976), rev'd, 566 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1977).
145 Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Iln. App. 3d 481, 311 N.E.2d 710 (1974), vacated, 61 InI. 2d
101, 329 N.E.2d 218 (1975).
146 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy is not pervasive; it ex-
tends only to fundamental rights and rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (there is a constitutional right to privacy independent of the right
to due process); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1 , Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973).
1'9 371 F. Supp. 974 (D. Ala. 1974).
150 Id. at 979.
11 Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975).
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and bore "no rational relationship to the objectives ostensibly sought to be
achieved by school officials. ' 15 2 "Anyway," the court continued, "a policy of
firing unwed mothers is irrefutably presumed to violate the equal protection
clause"1 53 because of the element of sex discrimination resulting from the im-
possibility of applying an equal standard to unwed fathers.""'
Several cases have determined that a discharge pursuant to a school policy
is unconstitutional because there was a deprivation of procedural due process.
A teacher who is not under contract is afforded the least protection because
she can usually be terminated without cause. However, courts have stated that
the termination may not be based on constitutionally impermissible grounds. 55
When a teacher is under a contract of employment, a property interest 56 is
created, entitling her to substantive and procedural due process rights,157 in-
cluding a pre-termination hearing. "8 A tenured teacher who becomes pregnant,
then, is afforded the most protection because evidence of injury to students,
faculty, or the school is necessary before there is sufficient cause for
dismissal. 5 9
2. Statutory Challenges In Private Sector
In the private sector, pregnant female employees who have been dis-
charged pursuant to a company policy have brought suit under the sex dis-
crimination provisions of Title VII. 60 The EEOC, the agency responsible for
Title VII enforcement, has ruled that a company policy of refusing to hire un-
wed mothers constitutes sex discrimination,16' unless the rule also applies to
unmarried fathers. 62
The Sixth Circuit agreed with this determination in Jacobs v. Martin
Sweets Co.'6' In that case, the defendant had demoted a pregnant, unmarried
employee from her position as executive secretary because of her immoral con-
1,2 Id. at 613 (quoting Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 317 F. Supp. 27, 35 (N.D.
Miss. 1973)).
153 Id. at 614.
15 Id. at 613.
Brown v. Bathke, 566 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1977).
156 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972); see also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
-- The court in Cochran v. Chidester School Dist., 456 F. Supp. 390, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1978)
(citing Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1976)), stated, "A right to procedural due pro-
cess is also triggered by the imposition of a stigma which might result in an adverse effect upon the
teacher's future employment opportunities or standing and associations in the community."
153 Id. Here, the court found that under Arkansas statute, which purported to establish a post-
termination hearing to teachers upon their request only, did not meet due process standards.
'59 Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 3d 481, 311 N.E.2d 710 (1974), vacated, 61111. 2d
101, 329 N.E.2d 218 (1975).
160 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981).
EEOC Decision Case No. 71-332 (1973), EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1 6164 (September 8, 1970).
162 Cf. Omaha Public Schools v. Brown, 13 F.E.P. (BNA) 767 (D. Neb. 1976). This court found
that it was not sex discrimination to fire an unwed, pregnant female teacher, although no single
male had ever been fired. The court justified the Board's decision because the students had "no-
ticed the woman's condition."
163 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977).
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duct.1'6 In a later Title VII action challenging the demotion, the defendant
argued that the female employee had failed to prove that she would have been
treated differently if she had been an unmarried father.'15 Without such proof,
the employer asserted, there could be no finding of sex discrimination. But the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Pregnancy is a condition unique to
women, the court reasoned. 6 To adopt the position that men and women
must be treated differently to prove a Title VII case, the court further ex-
plained, would exclude pregnancy from protection in all discrimination cases
- a result clearly contrary to the purposes of Title VII.'
67
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the Jacob's court's analysis in a
factually similar case. The court in Grayson v. Wickes Corp."6 8 ruled that re-
quiring the plaintiff to show that unmarried male employees who fathered out-
of-wedlock children would be treated differently than females was the proper
standard.6 9
The dissent in Grayson stated that the majority's standard was an errone-
ous burden of proof and one which would be impossible for a plaintiff to meet:
"It is totally unrealistic to think that evidence about an employer's treatment
of unwed males who had fathered a child would be available to a Title VII
plaintiff."'1
70
As the dissent states, the court is requiring the plaintiff to establish that
the employer has not discriminated against pregnant, unmarried men. This, of
course, is not the question because plaintiff's condition of being visibly preg-
nant, and in this case unwed, was a condition peculiar to the female physiology
alone. The majority's standard leaves the plaintiff without evidence to estab-
lish a prima facie case and relieves the employer of the burden of proving that
plaintiff's marital state or her pregnancy had any relationship at all to the per-
formance of her duties. Discrimination is not to be tolerated under the guise of
physical properties possessed by one sex.'7 '
Finally, some employers have even attempted to defend their "unwed
mother" policies under the BFOQ exception' 7 ' - but with little success.
Wisely, courts have found the discharges to be in violation of Title VII, be-
cause the employer's defense appeared to relate more to religious or moral
qualifications than sexual ones.
173
11" Id. at 369.
,e' Id. at 370.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 607 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979).
,69 Id. at 1197.
170 Id. at 1198.
17 Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
172 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
,73 Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). See also Doe v. Osteo-
pathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
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B. Unwed Couples
Employers have also discharged single employees who are living with
someone in an extramarital relationship. Employers assert that this "immoral
conduct" renders the employee unfit for the job.174 School boards, for example,
have attempted to fire teachers who are involved in a cohabitating relationship.
The boards argue that this activity comes within the proscription of state stat-
utory provisions allowing for dismissal due to immoral conduct.175
The major problem with these statutes is that they rarely define what ex-
actly constitutes immoral conduct. Courts, in turn, have developed various
constructions. One court,176 for example, summarily affirmed a school board's
dismissal of a teacher who was living with her boyfriend. The court stated that
this action was justified under a South Dakota statute which provided that a
teacher could be terminated for gross immorality.177 Other courts have at-
tempted to second guess what the legislature meant by !'immoral conduct" and
have enumerated factors1 8 to be considered in determining if a teacher's im-
moral conduct renders her unfit to teach. Finally, one court 179 found that this
type of statute was unconstitutionally vague because "a statute so broad makes
those charged with its enforcement the arbiters of morality for the entire
community."'180
Whatever the statutory construction, courts that have considered the issue
have been in agreement that a school board must show a nexus between the
educational process and the plaintiff's conduct before suspending the
plaintiff. 181
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case which, to
date, best exemplifies the constitutional issues involved when a couple is dis-
criminated against because of their living arrangement. In Hollenbaugh v. Car-
negie Free Library, 82 the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action 83 against the
174 Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), affd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
171 Id. at 397.
17' Sullivan v. Meade County Indep. School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 1237 (D.S.D. 1975), aff'd, 530
F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976).
177 Id. at 1248.
178 The factors include: age and maturity of the students of the teacher involved; likelihood
that the teacher's conduct will have an adverse effect on students or other teachers; the degree of
anticipated adversity; the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct; extenuating or aggravat-
ing circumstances surrounding the conduct; likelihood the conduct may be repeated; motives un-
derlying the conduct; whether conduct will have a chilling effect on rights of teachers involved or
other teachers. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969); see Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
179 Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
180 Id. at 255.
181 Thompson v. Southwest School Dist., 483 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Mo. 1980). See also Mindal
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In this case, the court held
that even if a clerk's conduct in living with a woman could be characterized as "immoral", he could
not constitutionally be terminated from government service on this ground absent a rational nexus
between this conduct and his duties as a postal clerk.
I8 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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Board of Trustees of Carnegie Library because of an alleged deprivation of
their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs had been employees of the library for
eleven years and had no significant problems until the discharge. The library
administrators discovered that the plaintiffs were living together and asked
them to cease. When they refused to alter their living arrangement, the Board
voted to terminate their employment because they were living together in
"open adultery. '184 The defendant's reasons for the discharge were threefold:
(1) that living together affected the ability of Ms. Hollenbaugh to perform her
librarian function; (2) that retaining them adversely affected the library's abil-
ity to perform its function in the community; and (3) that the plaintiffs stated
their intention to continue living together.1 5 It was plaintiffs' contention that
these reasons were not rationally related to the legitimate government interest.
The district court held otherwise, and the Third Circuit affirmed. They
concluded that any rights the plaintiffs had to live together must be balanced
against the state's interest, as represented by the library, in being able to prop-
erly perform its function in the community. 86 The court held under the mini-
mum rationality test that there was no violation of the equal protection clause
because the dismissal was not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. 18 7 Finally,
the court found no fundamental privacy right for two persons, one of whom is
married, to live together under the circumstances in this case. 88
Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissenting opinion' 88 from the denial of
certiorari in which he outlined the serious constitutional implications in per-
mitting the lower court decision to stand. The major thrust of his argument
was that the district court used only minimal scrutiny in analyzing the library's
justifications for the dismissals: "Such administrative intermeddling of impor-
tant personal rights merits more than minimal scrutiny."'190 Several rights were
implicated by the discharge, stated Justice Marshall. Those rights include the
right of the individual to engage in any of the common occupations of life;'9 '
the right to be free except in limited circumstances from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into one's privacy;19 2 the freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of marriage and family life;193 and the freedom of association.'"
As Justice Marshall's dissent clearly indicates, individual choices in mat-
ters of private life deserve more than minimal protection. In other decisions
1052 (1978).
183 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
184 436 F. Supp. at 1331.
185 Id. at 1332.
186 Id. at 1333.
167 Id.
188 Id. at 1334.
189 Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
19 Id. at 1054-55.
1'9 Id. at 1055.
192 Id.
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where private choice has been an issue, such as the issue of contraception in
Griswold v. Connecticut,19" the Court used the highest scrutiny to determine
that, if the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion.
C. Extramarital Affairs
The rights of persons engaged in extramarital affairs is also an unevenly
evolving area of the law. Courts are divided on the issue of whether one may be
fired for engaging in an extramarital affair or whether the fundamental right of
privacy extends to this activity.
Several illustrative cases have arisen in the law enforcement context, in-
volving policemen who are discharged for engaging in extramarital affairs in
violation of a department code of morality. One court19 that has analyzed the
issue under equal protection analysis used minimal scrutiny to uphold the dis-
missal of a police officer because the firing was not irrational, unreasonable, or
arbitrary. To this court, the rule was clearly designed to further the depart-
ment's interest in its morale, discipline, effectiveness, and reputation in the
community.197 Another court 98 found a similar statute to be unnecessarily
vague and overbroad and ordered the police officer to be reinstated. Still an-
other court 99 found that police officers' private lives are beyond the scope of
any reasonable police investigation by the department because of the tenuous
relationship between such activity and an officer's performance of the job.0
The most recent case addressing the issue of whether one can be fired for
having an extramarital affair answered in the affirmative. In Johnson v. San
Jacinto,20° a university registrar was demoted because he was having an affair
with the librarian and subsequently brought suit, contending that the action
invaded his constitutional right of privacy. The district court in Texas postu-
lated that the privacy cases are divided into three distinct classes of protect-
able interests.2 2 The first class is the right of marital privacy which extends to
physical and emotional intimacies between husbands and wives.203 The second
class is the right of family and home privacy which encompasses not only deci-
sions concerning raising children but also choices concerning family living ar-
rangements.2° The third category is the right of individual privacy which en-
195 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'"Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (D.N.C. 1978).
19 Id. at 563-64.
,, Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828 (D. Ga. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
19 Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see Major v. Hampton,
413 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1976).
100 Shuman, 470 F. Supp. at 459.
"1 498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
22 Id. at 574.
203 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
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compasses decisions concerning the integrity and autonomy of one's body.205
The court noted that, although there was some judicial support for plain-
tiff's assertion,208 it was going to adopt the approach taken in Hollenbaugh v.
Carnegie Free Library."7 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff's extra-
marital relationship was not protected under the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, because the right is "grounded on the marriage relationship, and the
right of a single or married individual to do with his or her body as he/she
pleases encompasses aspects incident to sexual intimacy, but currently does
not protect sexual relations themselves.
20 8
IV. CONCLUSION
One's career choice should be unhampered by rules making marital status
a critical factor in employment decisions. But, unfortunately, employers con-
tinue to apply such rules, often with the unwitting approval of courts which
refuse to fully enforce the promises of the United States Constitution and Title
VII. In this period of retrenchment from the strict enforcement of antidis-
crimination laws, the prospects for eliminating marital status as a factor in job
decisions appear bleak.
Joyce D. Edelman
205 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 532 (1942).
28 498 F. Supp. at 595 (citing Krzyzewski v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 14 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 7726 (D. Tenn. 1976)).
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